Ripples From the South Atlantic: Examining the Wider Significance of the Falklands War for the British Overseas Territories by Thomson, Calum
 Ripples From the South Atlantic: Examining the Wider 
Significance of the Falklands War for the British Overseas 
Territories 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The Faculty of Humanities of Leiden University 
In Partial Fulfilment of the requirements for 
The Degree of Master of Arts 
In International Relations 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
Calum Thomson BA 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Dr. Joost Augusteijn 
Word Count: 14,995 
 
Leiden 
July 2018 
C.R.Thomson 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................. 1 
The British Overseas Territories ............................................................................................................. 1 
Maps ........................................................................................................................................................ 2 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 4 
Methodology ........................................................................................................................................... 7 
Literature Review .................................................................................................................................... 9 
1. Self-Determination ............................................................................................................................ 14 
1.1 Context and Concept ................................................................................................................... 14 
1.2 The Anguilla Crisis and Diego Garcia ........................................................................................ 15 
1.3 Self-Determination and the Falklands ......................................................................................... 17 
1.4 Significance of the 1982 War ...................................................................................................... 20 
2. Citizenship ........................................................................................................................................ 23 
2.1 Historical Context ....................................................................................................................... 23 
2.2 Racial Bias .................................................................................................................................. 24 
2.3 The Falklands Effect ................................................................................................................... 25 
2.4 Overseas Territories .................................................................................................................... 26 
2.5 Significance of the 1982 War ...................................................................................................... 27 
3. Economic Commitment .................................................................................................................... 28 
3.1 The Falklands Economy ............................................................................................................. 28 
3.2 The Direct Effect of the War....................................................................................................... 29 
3.3 The Wider Picture ....................................................................................................................... 31 
3.4 Significance of the 1982 War ...................................................................................................... 33 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................ 35 
Works Cited .......................................................................................................................................... 39 
Primary Sources ................................................................................................................................ 39 
Secondary Sources ............................................................................................................................ 41 
 
 
 
 
C.R.Thomson 
 
1 
List of Abbreviations 
 
BIOT 
CBDT 
British Indian Ocean Territory 
Citizen of the British Dependent Territories 
CUKC Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies 
FIC Falkland Islands Company 
FIDC 
FIG 
Falkland Islands Development Corporation 
Falkland Islands Government 
HC House of Commons 
HL House of Lords 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
UN United Nations 
US United States 
 
The British Overseas Territories 
 
Name Population Area 
Akrotiri and Dhekelia 8,000 non-permanent military 255 km² 
Anguilla 13,500 91 km²  
Bermuda 64,000 54 km² 
British Antarctic Territory 0 (Seasonal scientific expeditions) 1.7m km² 
British Indian Ocean Territory 3,000 non-permanent military US & UK 46 km² 
British Virgin Islands 28,054 153 km² 
Cayman Islands 60,765 264 km² 
Falkland Islands 3,398 12,173 km² 
Gibraltar 32,194 6.7 km² 
Montserrat 4,900 101 km² 
Pitcairn 49 47 km² 
St. Helena, Ascension Island & 
Tristan da Cunha 
5,530 420 km² 
South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands 
0 (99 non-permanent officials and 
researchers) 
4066 km² 
Turks and Caicos Islands 32,000 430 km² 
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Figure 1: Timeline Map of the 1982 Falklands War 
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
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Figure 2: Map of the British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies  
Source: Wikimedia Commons 
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Introduction 
 
“The Falkland Islands’ misfortune has always to be wanted more than they are loved.” – 
Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins 
  
The telescope of many a historical seafarer on voyages across the Atlantic will have observed 
the rugged coastline of the Falkland Islands arising out of the mist. Most had nothing pleasant 
to say about their experience. Dr Samuel Johnson, noted essayist and lexicographer, whose 
damning indictment of the islands as bleak and barren; “which not even southern savages have 
dignified with habitation” (Johnson 1771, 24) questioned the value of the territory and why 
Britain would ever expend energy going to war over such a place. Johnson’s rather harsh 
assessment was included in files produced by the office of the Chiefs of Staff as Great Britain 
was preparing to do just that in 1982 (Freedman 2005a, 1). Windswept, with few trees, the 
Falkland Islands, or the Malvinas as they are known in Argentina, are an archipelago of some 
780 islands covering over 4,700 square miles, yet inhabited by a population that had fallen as 
low as 1,813 in 1980 and peaked at 3,200 in 2016. The islands are very sparsely populated, the 
majority of whom are the descendants of British sailors who voyaged there during the 18th and 
19th centuries. The Falkland Islands, and their continued British administration are a relic of a 
bygone colonialist era. One simply has to look at a map to see the geographical disparity in the 
competing territorial claims between Great Britain, which is some 8,000 miles away and 
Argentina, just 250 miles to the West (see fig.1 and fig.2). The origins of the sovereignty 
dispute date back to the late 17th century when British sailors first landed on the islands 
officially. However, it was not until 1833, after more than a century of the islands changing 
hands between European colonial powers and briefly the newly independent Argentina, that 
Britain established continuous, de facto sovereignty and began to develop a permanent colony. 
However, the history of the sovereignty dispute is long and complex and not the subject of this 
paper. Instead, the focus is on the war that took place over the islands between Britain and 
Argentina in 1982, and particularly its wider significance in several key domains.  
The fact that a colonial war took place as recently as 1982 is frankly bizarre, rendering 
it a historical anachronism. Despite its seemingly unique historical position, the war has 
suffered from a lack of academic attention. Perhaps this is due to the comparatively small scale 
of the war, which lasted only ten weeks between April and June of 1982 and claimed the lives 
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of less than a thousand. It could also be due to the small focal point of the conflict, a territory 
which has little bearing on the day to day life of British people and is of limited strategic and 
economic value. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, Oxford educated journalists and historians, 
who at the time of the war itself agreed to write a book about it no matter the outcome, have 
even gone so far as to suggest that the Falklands campaign was of “no wider significance for 
British interests and taught no lessons” (Hastings and Jenkins 2010, xvi). Interests in this 
context refers to Britain’s Overseas Territories, or as they were known at the time of the 
Falklands War, Britain’s Dependent Territories. We know this because Hastings and Jenkins 
qualify their argument with reference to other dependent territories. The idea that a war fought 
for one of these dependent territories would not have any knock-on effects for the others is 
difficult to believe at best. This thesis questions Hastings and Jenkins’ conclusion, seeking to 
prove the existence of a wider significance of the Falklands War, either for the other British 
territories directly, or for British government policy, that in turn had some impact on the other 
dependent/overseas territories. 
In this paper, I have sought to ascertain whether this idea holds up under closer 
examination by analysing the impacts of the war through lenses relevant to all British Overseas 
Territories, rather than simply those relevant to the Falkland Islands alone. The aim has been 
to establish whether or not the Falklands War can truly be considered a conflict “of no wider 
significance for British interests” as Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins claim (2010, xvi). To 
that end, the guiding research question of this thesis is: 
To what extent can the Falklands War be considered a conflict of wider significance for the 
British Overseas Territories? 
To answer this question, this paper first outlines the key arguments of selected works 
on topics relevant to the Falklands War and its impacts. This takes the form of a literature 
review that gives a snapshot of the historiographical debate and discussion that has taken place 
on the conflict, and any wider significance that has previously been inferred. Analysis will then 
come in the form of topic based chapters, that will assess the significance of the Falklands War 
to wider colonial interests in several key areas, namely; self-determination, citizenship and 
economic commitment. These areas have been chosen because they have a direct impact on 
life in, and the status of, all Britain’s Overseas Territories. Self-determination was used as a 
major point of justification in Britain’s decision to reconquer the Falkland Islands and has 
become the basis of Britain’s ongoing relationship with the territories. Citizenship, and 
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specifically the British Nationality Acts, which have defined the status of citizens in the 
dependent/overseas territories have undergone several major changes. These have seen the 
rights and status of these citizens reduced and/or improved, the Falklands War being directly 
responsible for an amendment to a major piece of legislation in this respect. Economically, 
Britain has allocated economic aid to the poorest territories and is committed to the defence of 
all its territories overseas. The Falklands War led to an intensive economic overhaul of the 
Falklands and an ongoing military commitment. 
The thesis will also have a timeframe of investigation. This will be the thirty years after 
the war in 1982. The reason for this is that the 30th anniversary of the war prompted some 
renewed academic and government interest in the war and the territory, with a slew of articles 
and government works published in 2012. Developments since 2012 have been limited and 
contribute little of value to the discussion. For the purposes of historical context and 
comparison, there will be some reference to events that took place before 1982, this will seek 
to illustrate the changes that took place in this thirty year period following the conflict. A range 
of primary and secondary sources will be consulted, with the primary sources focusing on 
parliamentary records and government publications while secondary sources are 
predominantly pertinent journal articles and books covering the subject of the Falklands War 
and decolonisation.  
This thesis will ultimately come to the conclusion that Hastings and Jenkins’ 
assessment that the war was of no wider significance to other British Overseas Territories is 
both inaccurate and reductive. Admittedly, the Falklands War may not have had an immediate 
impact on other British Overseas Territories, but it had some significant effect on British 
government policy in several areas, which itself would have a direct impact on other overseas 
territories. Thus, the wider significance of the Falklands War on other British Overseas 
Territories may have been limited, but was certainly not non-existent. This would therefore 
mean that the war can be considered a conflict of wider significance for the British Overseas 
Territories to a considerable extent. 
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Methodology 
 
This section details the process by which research was conducted through the use of primary 
and secondary sources to track evidence of change post-war, and the limitations faced in this 
respect. It will also consider the impact these limitations may have had on the overall scope of 
the thesis. 
As was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the focus of the Falklands War’s 
effects has been on the thirty years between 1982 and 2012. The overwhelming majority of 
sources consulted and used have been written, uttered or published within this time frame, with 
only a handful of exceptions typically for illustrative or contextual purposes.  
The use of primary sources focussed on parliamentary records, digitised government 
publications such as White Papers, legislation and research briefings commissioned by 
parliament. Comparison of these sources can identify the outline of government policy and 
changes in its evolution across time, this is vital in answering the research question. 
• Complete historical parliamentary records are available through the British 
government’s Hansard platform. Relevant records were located through the use of 
Hansard’s search function to identify topics of debate, by looking at debates that took 
place on significant historical dates, and by searching through the records of individual 
members of parliament  
• Government publications are not as simple to access. Indeed, most documents 
originating from before the late 1990s have not been digitised and are only accessible 
by visiting the National Archives in Kew or are not accessible at all. Visiting the 
National Archives in Kew was logistically impossible during the composition of this 
project. Therefore, government publications such as official policy documents and 
white papers used are typically from the late 1990s and beyond 
• Legislation such as the Nationality Acts referenced are digitised and freely available 
from the British government’s legislation portal, a service provided by the National 
Archives. Legislation can be viewed in its current operating format with all 
amendments in place or in its original print 
• Research briefings commissioned by parliament are available from the publications and 
records section of parliament’s website. As with other government publications, older 
C.R.Thomson 
 
8 
documents have not been digitised, and only those from 2007 and after have been made 
available online 
• Economic records, such as those relating to development aid given to certain overseas 
territories per annum are not easily accessible or have not been made available for 
public consumption. Data is often grouped into large subsections of spending, rather 
than broken down by individual recipient country or territory. The same applies for 
numerous government departments, such as defence, where the cost of the Falklands 
garrison is part of a larger figure budgeting for all overseas deployments. Figures used 
are those which have been published by the government or are the product of 
government researchers or authors of secondary source material 
Secondary sources have been used in conjunction with primary sources and have served to fill 
the gaps left by the unavailability or inaccessibility of the latter. These secondary sources range 
from journal publications analysing a specific aspect of the Falklands War, the islands 
themselves, or British Overseas Territories, to entire publications with an in-depth research 
remit. Secondary sources were selected based on a process of searching the Leiden University 
Library Catalogue for peer-reviewed journal articles or publications with topics and themes 
pertinent to the field of study in this thesis. The secondary sources procured by means other 
than the library catalogue were selected again by theme but with the added dimension of some 
simple research into the background of the writer or writers in question and their perceived 
level of expertise in the field of study.  
The issues of accessibility and availability presented by particularly the primary sources 
in question have imposed certain limitations on the approach of this project. In some instances, 
this has meant that it is difficult to conclude with absolute certainty whether certain effects 
were the direct result of the Falklands War which has been reflected in the corresponding 
argument. However, through personal inference and comparison of the multitude of primary 
and secondary sources consulted, one can say with some confidence that the conclusions 
reached here are accurate, confirming the wider significance of the Falklands War for the 
British Overseas Territories.  
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Literature Review 
 
This section details the historiographical debate surrounding the Falklands War and provides a 
snapshot of the literature on the war and other British Overseas Territories. It will conclude 
with a statement on how this thesis fits into the wider discussion and the niche it seeks to fill. 
  
In the opening gambit of their book on the conflict, Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins argue 
that “the (Falklands) war was of no wider significance for British interests and taught no lessons” 
(Hastings and Jenkins 2010, xvi). This is undoubtedly a bold statement and one that is certainly 
open to challenge. Now I am not suggesting that the Falklands War, a bilateral territorial 
dispute in the South Atlantic, could be classed as having the same significance with regards to 
British interests, or indeed, world politics, as much larger conflicts like the two world wars 
certainly did. But to dismiss the Falklands conflict out of hand, without any deeper analysis 
feels short-sighted. To consider the extent to which the Falklands War can be considered a 
conflict of no wider significance to British interests, we must first detail the theory itself and 
the arguments which have been used in support of it.  
Hastings and Jenkins cite the examples of Diego Garcia and Hong Kong in supporting 
their argument. In Diego Garcia, the largest of seven atolls that form the British Indian Ocean 
Territory, the small population was forcibly relocated by the British government in order to 
establish an air base between 1968 and 1973. Hong Kong, a much larger territory than Diego 
Garcia or the Falkland Islands in terms of population was famously handed over to the People’s 
Republic of China at the end of the territory’s lease in 1997. The intention here is to imply that 
the British government did not maintain a steadfast policy across its remaining colonial 
interests and would act in whichever way would benefit the government of the day most, rather 
than in defence of self-determination or some other cause (Hastings and Jenkins 2010, xvi). 
This contradiction regarding the British position in using self-determination as a justification 
for defending the Falkland Islands and completely ignoring it in the case of Diego Garcia has 
been noted by more than one observer in the past (Aldrich and Connell 1998, 181). John 
Madeley believes that the reason for such a stark contrast in the British treatment of Falkland 
Islanders and the Chagossians or Ilois people as they are otherwise known, who inhabited 
Diego Garcia is rooted in the colour of their skin (Madeley 1985, 3). However, what Madeley’s 
interpretation does not consider is the idea that the Falklands War may have been a precedent-
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setting moment, that self-determination had become the prime concern in all matters related to 
the surviving colonies. That is not to say that what the British government did to the people of 
Diego Garcia was not utterly wrong, but that the experience and the ongoing legal battle it 
spawned may have had some effect on shaping future British policy towards its overseas 
citizens. 
This close temporal proximity between the Falklands War and the beginning of 
negotiations over Hong Kong, as well as the significance of Hong Kong as one of the last major 
British colonies merits at least some discussion. Comparisons with the Falklands situation have 
arisen by virtue of the fact that negotiations between Britain and China on the status of the 
territory began in 1984, in the wake of the Falklands War. Indeed, mention of the Falklands 
success is frequent in literature on the decolonisation of Hong Kong. Margaret Thatcher, said 
to have been buoyed by the success of the campaign in the South Atlantic was, according to 
Roger Buckley, initially unwilling to consider surrendering British sovereignty over Hong 
Kong at all (Buckley 1997, 110). When Thatcher failed to offer any viable counter-strategy to 
the relinquishing of British control of Hong Kong, the realisation that conceding sovereignty 
was inevitable became a fixed prospect (Buckley 1997, 110). The relevance of Hong Kong to 
the debate is questionable as it differed from other British colonial possessions in one crucial 
respect, i.e. a significant part of the territory that made up Hong Kong was subject to a ninety-
nine year lease signed in 1898 (Buckley 1997, 3). The rapid growth and urban spread of Hong 
Kong had rendered the different territories of Hong Kong inseparable, closing the door on any 
strategy that could allow for negotiation with China for continued British sovereignty over 
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon (Buckley 1997, 110).  
Ultimately, the British government considered a war against Argentina to be winnable, 
otherwise they would never have embarked on such an endeavour in the first place. As John 
Flowerdew and Roger Buckley both point out, in China, Britain had a much more formidable 
opponent than Argentina, one armed with nuclear weapons and a permanent seat on the United 
Nations Security Council (Flowerdew 1998, 37 and Buckley 1997, 105). It was no secret that 
China could roll its tanks into Hong Kong and capture the territory with relative ease, Britain 
had little in the way of deterrents to prevent such an eventuality (Buckley 1997, 104). Resigned 
to the fact that a military intervention, or indeed, continued British sovereignty or 
administration of Hong Kong in any way, were not viable options, the negotiating position 
shifted in the fifth round of talks mid-way through 1983. The objective became winning as 
much autonomy and preservation of the contemporary political system in Hong Kong as 
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possible (Flowerdew 1998, 37). Fundamentally, it is difficult to compare the wider significance 
of the Falklands War with regards to Hong Kong as the two disputes differ so greatly, with the 
lease being the key to unlocking Hastings and Jenkins’ use of it as support for their claim.  
The success of the Falklands campaign is widely credited with winning the 1983 
general election as the British public were carried along on a wave of state sponsored 
nationalism which Thatcher herself referred to as the ‘Falklands spirit’ (Hastings and Jenkins 
2010, 396-397 and Hewer 2013, 148 and Begley 2012, 232-233 and Fourches 2013, 101). 
However, this discourse has been challenged by Sanders et al whose comprehensive study, 
including polling data, came to the conclusion that the real reason behind Conservative 
electoral success was intelligent or fortuitous macroeconomic management (Sanders et al. 1987, 
281-283). Therefore, the so called ‘Falklands effect’ was likely the result of empirical 
coincidence as opposed to an accurate theoretical interpretation of the effects of events on 
politics. 
Another way of framing the wider significance of the Falklands War that is common in 
the literature on the subject, pertains to the legal dimension, particularly with regards to the 
right to self-determination. As Hastings and Jenkins outline, the strongest argument the British 
have in asserting their sovereignty over the islands is through this principle. The Islanders have 
made it clear in several referendums that they wish to remain British and this right to determine 
one’s leaders is enshrined in the UN Charter (Hastings and Jenkins 2010, 9). Argentina, and 
indeed most writers on the subject have noted the main issue in the British use of this line of 
argument in defending their sovereignty claim. This is that the islanders are not an indigenous 
people but rather, a population, transplanted from the mother country over time (Fourches 2013, 
106-107). Marc Fourches highlights the complexity of the situation and the emphasis placed 
on certain vocabulary in dialogue, charter and resolutions on the islands. UN resolution 1514 
from 1960 specifies that “all peoples have a right to self-determination” but in a 1965 resolution 
inviting the governments of Argentina and Great Britain to negotiate over the Falklands, the 
UN urges both parties to take into account the interests of the ‘population’ of the islands as 
opposed to people. Fourches lauds the importance of this choice of vocabulary, implying that 
because the Falklanders are considered a population and not a people, that the right to self-
determination does not necessarily apply to them (Fourches 2013, 107-109).  
In contrast, Hastings and Jenkins insist that the population of the islands is two-thirds 
indigenous and that they are covered under the UN Charter (Hastings and Jenkins 2010, 9). 
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This raises an interesting quandary, as many of the Falkland Islanders have been born and 
raised on the territory and lived there for several generations. At what point, if any, does a 
population become an indigenous people, especially if in the territory in question there is little 
or no evidence of an ancient indigenous people. The argument has been used in reverse, with 
claims that Argentines themselves are transplanted Europeans and not an indigenous people 
(Chehabi 1985, 218). Britain has certainly picked and chosen its moments to invoke this right 
in defence of its claims and territory, the people of Diego Garcia and Hong Kong being famous 
examples when Britain turned the other cheek, either for its own interests or because it wasn’t 
feasible (Fourches 2013, 110-111). However, Hong Kong was as previously explained, a 
difficult situation and other examples of ignoring the right to self-determination post-Falklands 
War are hard to come by. The wider significance for British interests here is that the situation 
is very similar to another British overseas territory with a majority non-indigenous population, 
Gibraltar.  
Negotiations over both the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar had taken place before the 
1982 war with their respective bilateral parties. Gibraltar is a small peninsula dominated by a 
rocky promontory in southern Spain, ceded in perpetuity to Britain under the 1713 Treaty of 
Utrecht. Tacit Spanish support for Argentina’s cause in the Falklands dispute and the war had 
a dampening effect on British willingness to negotiate over the status of Gibraltar (Aldrich and 
Connell 1998, 215). Lawrence Freedman argues that despite Spain supporting Argentina in 
their offensive against the British, the former almost unanimously opposed taking the same 
kind of military action over Gibraltar. Any hostility towards Britain could have jeopardised 
Spain’s attempt to join NATO and the European Community (Freedman 2005b, sec. 7, ch. 34). 
Despite this, Peter Gold argues that the Spanish maintained a fervent interest in the conflict 
and considered their options much more carefully than Argentina. This was due in part to the 
risk of Morocco imitating Argentina in trying to reclaim the Spanish territories of Ceuta and 
Melilla militarily (Gold 1994, 51). Gibraltar, it was surmised popularly, was not worth the life 
of a single Spanish soldier and rather than building tensions, Spain should be building good 
relations with Gibraltarians so that one day they would be convinced that autonomous status 
within the Spanish Kingdom was their preferred option (Gold 1994, 51-53). The Falklands War 
served as a stark warning to competing interests that Britain was prepared to defend its overseas 
concerns militarily. Spain had the opportunity of seeing how a potential conflict over Gibraltar 
may have played out whilst maintaining a position that condemned the use of force in resolving 
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international disputes (Gold 1994, 51). Had the war not happened, perhaps the Spanish may 
have taken a different position, it is difficult to say. 
However, the Falklands War did happen and it cost the British government a great deal. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, Britain could not confirm the future status of the islands, the economy 
of which was dominated by sheep farming and thus highly dependent on the price of wool and 
British imports (Freedman 2005a, 40). As Hastings and Jenkins argue, the declining population 
of the Falklands and its status as a notoriously wealthy recipient of Overseas Development 
Ministry funds had to be weighed against the economic possibilities provided by a continent 
of 240 million people (Hastings and Jenkins 2010, 16). Freedman points out that for years, the 
British government avoided making a definitive decision over the islands. The cost of 
implementing new defences was too high but the political risk of making a deal with Argentina 
against the islander’s wishes was also too great. The war had the effect of settling this choice 
(Freedman 2005b, sec. 9, ch. 44). Britain was obliged to spend some £2bn fortifying the islands, 
including an air base and garrison that would defend the islands from any future attack 
(Hastings and Jenkins 2010, xi-xii). A system of economic reforms and developments was also 
implemented and according to Klaus Dodd’s 2012 assessment has reinvigorated a once 
declining territory. This is judged to be worth the £70m pound per annum defence bill (Dodds 
2012, 698). The effect of this increased economic development of the Falkland Islands as a 
result of the war on other British Overseas Territories is a topic seemingly unexplored by 
literature on the subject.  
This thesis does not focus on the specifics of the sovereignty dispute or the war itself 
as many articles and other works do. Instead, this thesis seeks to explore the wider significance 
of the Falklands War on other British Overseas Territories in the thirty years since it occurred. 
There were numerous articles published on the thirtieth anniversary of the conflict which go 
into detail on the war’s transformative effect on the Falkland Islands themselves, but often little 
to no mention of how this war may have affected other territories. This is the gap in the 
literature that this thesis addresses.  
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1. Self-Determination 
 
This section focuses on self-determination, a legal concept that was used by Britain as a 
justification for going to war to reclaim the Falkland Islands. A concept which has become the 
basis of Britain’s ongoing relationship with its remaining overseas territories.  
 
1.1 Context and Concept 
The principle of self-determination purportedly gives the people of a specific territory the right 
to choose their own sovereignty and international political status. It is however, one of the most 
widely disputed tenets of international law and is frequently employed as an argument in 
territorial disputes. Indeed, while the principle itself has become an accepted norm, its content, 
particularly the wording of UN resolutions on the subject, and how this applies to certain 
scenarios remains an issue of great contention (Kattan 2009, 118). A number of nations 
challenged the wording of various points in the UN Charter, including Britain. In the case of 
self-determination, a position was taken that this ‘right’ must be subordinate to the maintenance 
of world peace. This stance takes the view that self-determination is a principle as opposed to 
an absolute right but this view has not been supported by the UN (Dunnett 1983, 420, 426). 
There is also this distinction between the terms ‘people’ and ‘population’, a people being a 
group indigenous to a certain territory and a population being a group that has settled there. 
Argentina has argued that the Falkland Islanders are not an indigenous population because they 
are not native to the territory. Under closer inspection this argument unravels, the islands have 
no indigenous human population and Argentines themselves are predominantly the 
descendants of European settlers who themselves arrived long after the ancestors of the 
Falkland Islanders. There is also the legal and moral objection of discriminating against a 
modern population by the ‘sins’ of its forefathers (Chehabi 1985, 217-218). 
Similarly, the idea of population size has been a common issue in questions of self-
determination and independence. In the Falklands case, Argentina has argued that the 
population of the Falkland Islands is too small to constitute a ‘people’ with full rights to self-
determination. That said, international practice has shown population size to be a factor of 
questionable relevance with numerous small nations taking their place at the UN or declaring 
sovereign independence (Chehabi 1985, 217). It is however, difficult to deny the vulnerability 
of small populations when it comes to the preservation of rights. The Falkland Islanders had 
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the benefit of an influential group of lobbyists in Westminster making a strong case to the 
government on their behalf (Aldrich and Connell 1998, 203). Other territories have not had the 
benefit of this kind of political pressure being applied on their behalf. This is likely due to the 
non-British ethnicity of the denizens in question, a fact which limits the political traction that 
can be achieved in domestic British politics.  
 
1.2 The Anguilla Crisis and Diego Garcia 
There are numerous historical examples of the British government flaunting the right to self-
determination in its dependent territories. This is significant as the government would go on to 
use self-determination as a major argument in defending its sovereignty over the Falkland 
Islands and in justification for going to war over the territory. 
In Britain’s retreat from the Caribbean, self-determination was a casualty of 
centripetalism, whereby a form of anglophone federalisation was the preferred option for the 
British government. In theory, this federalisation would ensure an orderly transfer of powers 
into efficient groupings of territories that would be more financially stable and less reliant on 
Britain in the post-colonial world (Mawby 2012, 251). In practice, British policy makers were 
convinced that small-island politicians were ‘feckless’ and would not be able to function 
independently (Mawby 2012, 252-254). However, as with colonial policies of old, local 
populations were not widely consulted on these constitutional changes and certain territories 
were displeased with their territorial groupings. Anguilla was one such territory that fell victim 
to this unwanted federalisation. Despite having been settled by refugees from St Kitts in the 
17th century, the fortunes of the two territories, seventy miles apart, had diverged greatly over 
centuries and little in common remained, aside from a colonially instituted political link 
(Mawby 2012, 251-252). Crisis arose when Britain changed the nature of the political 
relationship St Kitts, and therefore Anguilla, had with Britain, elevating them from 
dependencies to the status of associated statehood. This allowed St Kitts more power over their 
northern neighbour and Anguillans believed they would be subject to despotic rule from the 
larger islands without the protection of direct British administration (Mawby 2012, 257).  
Despite popular opposition to associated statehood in Anguilla, this change in status 
still came to pass in February 1967. A referendum was held and Anguilla declared itself an 
independent republic and seceded from the union with St Kitts and Nevis in July of the same 
year (Mawby 2012, 257-258). After hearing repeated pleas from the Kittitian government for 
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British assistance in restoring control over Anguilla, condescending analyses in Whitehall that 
Anguillans were akin to children and prone to falling under the spell of foreign influences, and 
a disastrous visit by British minister, William Whitlock, in which he was forced from the island 
at gunpoint, the decision was made to intervene by force and restore Anguilla to its associated 
statehood with St Kitts and Nevis (Mawby 2012, 263, 267). It was surmised that gangster 
elements had taken over Anguilla and this fact could cause a loss of international prestige and 
inspire movements in other British territories with Michael Stewart, then Foreign Secretary, 
making specific reference to the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar (Mawby 2012, 266). The 
British government sanctioned the use of a small invasion force to oust the territory’s 
secessionist leadership and bring Anguilla back under Kittitian control. The whole episode was 
farcical. Journalists accompanying the invasion force noted that Ronald Webster, the island’s 
secessionist leader was not a gangster and clearly represented the self-determination of his 
people in opposing the association with St Kitts and Nevis (Mawby 2012, 267).  
What the British government had failed to consider in all this was the Anguillan 
people’s right to self-determination. Britain could argue that they were forced to subordinate 
this right for the preservation of world peace but it would be difficult to make this argument 
stick. Anguilla is poor and underdeveloped, and the British were ironically more worried about 
an American takeover than any move by the Soviet Union (Mawby 2012, 249, 256). The 
Anguillan people had clearly expressed a will to be treated independently, not necessarily 
desiring full independence, but reverting to British dependency with no political affiliation to 
St Kitts and Nevis. This had been ignored. 
At the same time as the Anguilla crisis, another violation of self-determination was 
taking place in a British territory in the Indian Ocean. Diego Garcia is the largest atoll in the 
BIOT, which itself was once part of Mauritius. That is, until the British government made the 
sale of the islands to Britain part of Mauritius’ independence process (Madeley 1985, 3). Diego 
Garcia was home to some 2,000 Chagossians, the descendants of lepers and fisherman that had 
been sent to colonise the islands which had had no indigenous population in the 18th century 
(Madeley 1985, 3-4). After the territory had been officially seceded from Mauritius, Britain 
negotiated with the United States about leasing the territory for an airbase. Military planners 
concluded that the airbase and the islanders could not mix and with little to no media attention 
or advocacy on their behalf, the Chagossians were quietly expelled from their homes in Diego 
Garcia and the surrounding islands and never allowed to return (Madeley 1985, 4-5). This 
expulsion took place over a number of years and in the early 1970s began to overlap with 
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British assurances that the Falkland Islanders, a population of almost exactly the same size as 
the Chagossians, would be consulted at every stage of negotiations over that territory. 
Meanwhile, said Chagossians were unceremoniously dumped in the slums of the Mauritian 
capital, Port Louis, illustrating the existence of an outrageous double standard over Britain’s 
implementation of self-determination (Madeley 1985, 5). 
The actions of the British government in Anguilla and Diego Garcia clearly 
demonstrate that the archetypes and racial prejudices that had historically sustained the empire, 
were still at the heart of decision making well into the era of decolonisation. The threat of the 
Cold War, which had spread to all four corners of the globe and Britain’s international prestige 
were prioritised over any notion of self-determination or other human rights that these small 
populations should have been afforded by law. The preservation of world peace argument could 
be made in response to Diego Garcia as the territory was used to establish a US air base during 
the expulsion. However, it seems like an unnecessarily extreme measure to expel these people 
from their homeland for this sole purpose. Indeed, the islands besides Diego Garcia that make 
up the BIOT have remained relatively untouched, with no real reason why they could not be 
populated by displaced Chagossians (Madeley 1985, 10). If Britain had treated the Chagossians 
with the same level of respect they would afford the Falklanders just over a decade later, 
establishing an air base around an existing human settlement or amicably relocating the 
Chagossians within the BIOT would not have been such an unreasonable proposition.  
The fallout from both these scenarios was surprisingly limited. The Anguillan crisis 
was undoubtedly an embarrassing debacle for the British government which drew international 
backlash and humiliation in the press as a result of the invasion. It was even referred to as 
‘Wilson’s Suez’, after the then Prime Minister Harold Wilson (Mawby 2012, 268), but such a 
comparison has not held true. The Anguillan crisis has not been remembered or written about 
to anywhere near the extent as the Suez crisis has been (Mawby 2012, 272). Likewise, the 
plight of the Chagossian people has largely been forgotten, adding more credence to the 
conclusion that self-determination is a right only upheld universally to those overseas peoples 
with the correct skin colour or ethnicity.  
 
1.3 Self-Determination and the Falklands 
There is an irony in Britain, that old colonial power, using self-determination as a justification 
for defending the Falkland Islands militarily. This was a nation that had built an empire on 
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ignoring that right, now using it to its own advantage in sustaining a small piece of that 
diminishing empire (Chehabi 1985, 216). As previously discussed, the British government had 
been ignoring that right as recently as the previous decade, indeed it was not until 1980 that the 
Anguillans finally attained what they had democratically chosen in the late 1960s and the 
political association with St Kitts and Nevis was officially terminated, returning the territory 
to the status of overseas dependency (Mawby 2012, 270).  
But was it the case that the British government had learned from these past mistakes 
when dealing with other territories and now accepted self-determination as a truly universal 
right? Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher extolled the loyalty of the Falklanders in an interview 
at the height of the crisis, declaring her government’s support for their right to self-
determination but also not failing to mention their British heritage in elucidating her argument 
(Dunnett 1983, 415). Yet Thatcher’s enthusiastic approach to the Falklands and their islanders’ 
right to self-determination was not in line with British policy up until the point of the Argentine 
invasion, which was to solve the issues of small territories by ignoring them altogether. 
Successive British governments had allowed the territory’s infrastructure and economy to 
deteriorate to the point where the population would begin to rely on Argentina to fulfil its basic 
needs and supplies instead of Britain (Chehabi 1985, 220). In addressing a gathering of some 
five hundred islanders on a visit to the Falklands in 1968, Lord Chalfont, the Minister of State 
at the Foreign Office, could offer no assurances on the future of the territory. Indeed, he warned 
the islanders that Britain was no longer the great imperialist power of the 19th century and 
hoped they would acknowledge that keeping the Falklands British “means something different 
to what it meant in 1900” (Beck 1985, 657). Indeed at the same point in the late 1960s, Britain 
was negotiating with Argentina on the future status of the territory and according to Foreign 
Office papers had accepted in principle the renunciation of British sovereignty over the islands 
under certain conditions (Aldrich and Connell 1998, 203).  
Lobbying efforts eventually put paid to any suggestion that the British government 
would relinquish sovereignty but the fact that they had been prepared to do so shows that the 
self-determination of the islanders was not as important as the domestic political significance 
the issue held for the party in power (Aldrich and Connell 1998, 204, 211). Despite various 
setbacks, negotiations continued in one form or another right through the 1970s and into the 
early 1980s and Margaret Thatcher’s tenure (Aldrich and Connell 1998, 204-205). This in itself 
shows that there was really no change in British views on self-determination influenced by the 
past mistakes of Anguilla, Diego Garcia and other instances. The government, like any other, 
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would pursue whatever course of action it felt benefitted its own political position the most. 
Fortunately for the Falkland Islanders, the Argentine invasion played right into the hands of 
this decision making position.  
There had been some evolution in the British position on the Falklands dispute in line 
with a general shift in decolonisation discourse that took place in the second half of the 20th 
century. This has been evidenced by a move away from traditional arguments of territorial 
integrity towards a greater emphasis on self-determination which had become the rallying cry 
for the anti-colonial movement (Freedman 2005a, 2-3). The Falklands War helped cement this 
evolution towards a wider acceptance of self-determination as a universal right. However, the 
British government clearly did not consider self-determination a universal right in the years 
before the war and had been proposing numerous options to the Argentinians including 
leaseback and joint administration in an attempt to solve the dispute (Aldrich and Connell 1998, 
204-205). The Falkland Islanders had no desire for any kind of sovereignty transfer or 
Argentine governance and talks reached an impasse after it became clear that the islander’s 
possessed a kind of veto on any deal made between the two governments. However, the British 
government attempted to circumvent this by suggesting the Argentinians enact a hearts and 
minds campaign aimed at winning the approval of the Islanders, which over time could have 
seen a softening in the Islander’s hard-line opposition to Argentina (Freedman 2005a, 17-19). 
Self-determination then, was both Britain’s main argument in defending its sovereignty over 
the islands and its greatest obstacle in resolving the dispute that hindered international relations 
and trade in South America once and for all. The invasion and subsequent conflict would 
change this contradictory stance held by the British and bring them down firmly on one side of 
the fence.  
The invasion was a shock and an embarrassing affront to Britain. Britain’s power was 
seriously waning and Argentina had gambled that Britain would simply relinquish the territory 
rather than attempt a risky reconquest for such a small population (Arquilla and Rasmussen 
2001, 739, 742). That gamble backfired and Britain went to war, determined that it would not 
be bested by what even opposition politicians were referring to as the “tinpot fascist junta that 
rules Argentina” (Silkin, HC Deb 02 April 1982). In addressing the House of Commons the 
day after the invasion, Margaret Thatcher stated unequivocally “We cannot allow the 
democratic rights of the islanders to be denied by the territorial ambitions of Argentina” 
(Thatcher, HC Deb Apr 3 1982). The tone was set, and self-determination, along with the 
Islanders’ cultural identity and the fact that Britain had been attacked without provocation 
C.R.Thomson 
 
20 
became the chief arguments in justifying the use of force to the British public, the majority of 
whom were seen to be receptive and supportive despite the absurdity in sending 20,000 men to 
reclaim a relic of colonialism 8,000 miles away (Aldrich and Connell 1998, 207 and Hastings 
and Jenkins 2010, xi).  
 
1.4 Significance of the 1982 War 
Self-determination, simplified as the ‘wishes’ of the islanders had become a rallying cry in 
stirring up public support for the campaign, but by going to war for it, had Britain in some way 
committed itself to upholding it in the future? It is certainly the case that modern British 
government policy is almost entirely based on the right to self-determination, which it makes 
reference to repeatedly, especially in conjunction with assurances that this right will be 
defended. Any territory can choose to maintain its constitutional link with Britain or pursue a 
different future as long as the people have been consulted. Specific reference is made to the 
Falkland Islands and Gibraltar as territories in which Britain’s support is steadfast, though it 
reiterates that it is prepared to defend all of the territories from external threats (FCO 2010-
2015 Policy). The frequent reiterations that Britain will defend these territories from external 
threats certainly stems from the Falklands War, the only instance where such a territory has 
faced a real external threat in recent times. Indeed, it is difficult to conjure up any rival 
explanation as to what event since the Falklands War could have shaped Britain’s policy 
towards its overseas territories in such a way. If another territory where the population had 
democratically chosen to remain British faced the same kind of attack from a foreign power, 
the expectation, at the very least in the territory concerned, would be that Britain defend it 
militarily. 
Britain’s use of self-determination as a legal justification in defence of the Falklands 
was probed by members of parliament during the crisis, who wondered whether the 
government would actually uphold the principle universally. Tony Marlow, a Conservative MP 
asked Margaret Thatcher whether she would remind the Israeli government that “self-
determination is as important for 4½ million Palestinians as it is for the Falkland Islanders”, 
forcing the Prime Minister to reiterate several times that “we believe in it as a principle” and 
that it is “equally important to uphold the right of self-determination” in this case and in all 
others (HC Deb 08 Jun 1982). Similarly, Tony Benn, the former Labour cabinet minister 
questioned the wisdom of using self-determination as a means for military action, declaring it 
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a “gross act of self-deception to pretend to the British people that we have the power, the means 
or the will to defend outposts of empire” (Benn, HC Deb 29 April 1982).  
Mrs Thatcher, on record committing herself and the government to self-determination 
as a principle, would face their first real test just a year after the conclusion of the war. For it 
to be said that the 1982 war had the effect of solidifying Britain’s commitment to the principle 
of self-determination there would have to be no evidence that they would attempt to subvert it 
in other scenarios, as they had done before the war in Anguilla and Diego Garcia among others. 
Coincidentally, the territory involved in this ‘test’ was one that had been a major part of 
Britain’s Anguilla crisis. The island nation of St Kitts and Nevis declared independence in 1983, 
terminating its associated statehood with Britain and ending the latter’s responsibilities towards 
this new nation. Lord Skelmersdale, a Conservative peer summed up the government action in 
response to the Kittitian declaration in a session at the House of Lords where final approval of 
the motion would take place. In his summary, he stated that he was satisfied that the criteria 
for self-determination had been met and that there was no reason for the British government 
not to accede to the request of the Kittitian government for independence (Skelmersdale, HL 
Deb 09 May 1983). Even without mention of the Falklands War, this would seem to suggest 
that self-determination had been confirmed as an operating principle in Britain’s dealings with 
its overseas territories. Thatcher had gone on record in defence of the principle repeatedly just 
the year before, to renege on it would have dire political consequences. Britain had nothing to 
gain from standing in the way of Kittitian independence and unlike the Falklands scenario, had 
no leg to stand on legally.  
Aside from Hong Kong, in which the British really had no option but to relinquish 
sovereignty to China, there have been no other clear violations of self-determination vis-a-vis 
British territories overseas. Referendums have been held in most territories on continuing their 
existing constitutional links with Britain and as yet there have been no changes to the status 
quo. Crucially there does not seem to be any evidence that Britain is interfering in these 
democratic processes as most territories have a high degree of self-government, with Britain 
only being responsible for matters of defence and foreign policy. Therefore it could be said that 
the Falklands War and its high profile use of self-determination had the effect of committing 
Britain to this principle which it had so flagrantly abused in instances before the conflict. Any 
attempt to subvert it after the conflict, which had been a world event, would undermine its 
position vis-a-vis the Falklands dispute going forward and potentially draw the ire and criticism 
of the press and opposition politicians alike. In this sense then it can be argued that the 
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Falklands War, at least in the realm of self-determination was of great significance to the other 
British overseas territories. The war helped cement the change in discourse relating to Britain’s 
ongoing relationship with its overseas territories from one based in territorial integrity to a 
relationship based on the self-determination of the territory’s citizens and their choice of 
whether to remain constitutionally linked to Britain or not. The Falklands War was thus of 
wider significance for the other British Overseas Territories in this crucial respect.  
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2. Citizenship 
 
This section focuses on the impact of the Falklands War on British citizenship policy. The 
British government introduced a new classification of British citizenship in 1981 which greatly 
reduced the rights of most citizens in dependent territories. The Falklands War directly led to 
an amendment to this legislation that accentuated racial bias in British citizenship policy. 
 
2.1 Historical Context 
In the early decolonisation period after the Second World War the British Nationality Act of 
1948 conferred British citizenship on the population of the remaining colonies and the 
Commonwealth (Nationality Act 1948, Part 2, Sec 4). The perhaps unsurprising effect of this 
legislation, given the size of the Commonwealth was a wave of immigration into Britain, on 
which subsequent governments between 1962 and 1981 attempted to impose limitations 
(Moore 2000, 1). These limitations, which came in the form of immigration and citizenship 
legislation that reacted to contemporary political pressures made for a muddled and confused 
body of rules and regulations. The Nationality Act of 1981 sought to rationalise and standardise 
this area of law-making, whilst also ensuring the rights of 2.6 million British citizens in Hong 
Kong were neutralised before the territory’s return to China. The populations of the other 
dependencies and how this legislation would affect them was a footnote in government decision 
making as the potential influx of 2.6 million from Hong Kong far outweighed the 400,000 
living in the other dependent territories (Moore 2000, 20). Under the 1948 act, the majority of 
people concerned were ‘Citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies’, meaning those born in 
the colonies often enjoyed the same rights and privileges as those born in Britain itself.  
After the 1971 Immigration Act reduced the status of Commonwealth citizens without 
a patrial link to Britain to that of foreigners with no right of abode, the 1981 Act shifted its 
attention to preventing potential immigration as opposed to actual immigration. The Act 
created a new form of British citizenship that would distinguish between those with a ‘close’ 
connection to Britain and the rest (Moore 2000, 3). Thus the title ‘Citizen of the British 
Dependent Territories’ was born. This status solidified an applicable persons’ connection to 
their dependent territory whilst distancing their connection to Britain (Nationality Act 1981, 
Part 2, Sec 15-23). Becoming a CBDT denied that person any right of abode in Britain and 
limited this right to their own territory. This essentially rendered the recipients of this 
classification second-class citizens, making the rights and freedoms they had once enjoyed as 
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CUKCs now exclusive to full British citizens. The intention was that CBDTs would eventually 
become citizens of their respective territories once they became independent or part of an 
existing state (Moore 2000, 3). The main issue with this line of thinking is that it was, and still 
is the case, that many of these dependent territories were unlikely to ever become independent 
states, given the unrealistic practicalities of such a political status for islands and territories 
with very small populations.  
 
2.2 Racial Bias 
The greater importance placed on a patrial link to Britain by the 1981 Nationality Act created 
a racial bias in its application to Britain’s territorial interests overseas. Gibraltarians were big 
winners from the 1981 Act. This is perhaps unsurprising given the territory’s relative 
geographical proximity to Britain, making patrial links easier to establish, but it is also largely 
the result of the ethnic makeup of the territory, which despite mixed origins in Genoa, Malta 
and North Africa is predominantly white British. Unsurprisingly, the ‘transplanted’ population 
of the Falkland Islands of which almost the entirety is descended from British sailors and 
settlers were also recipients of full British citizenship after the 1981 Act. That is, however, 
apart from some 400 islanders whose antecedents had all been born on the Falkland Islands 
themselves or in some other country (Moore 2000, 4). Essentially, 400 islanders lacked a 
grandparent with the appropriate birth place to claim full British citizenship under the new 
rules.  
The legislation simultaneously deprived black and Asian populations of rights and 
freedoms associated with entering and remaining in Britain whilst leaving “routes home” for 
white Britons born within the boundaries of the empire (Tyler 2010, 63). The 1981 Act was 
therefore quite clearly a racist measure that transformed discriminatory immigration policy into 
actual forms of British citizenship (Moore 2000, 3). Much of the opposition to the 1981 
Nationality Act in parliament was focused on protecting these small white populations who 
stood to lose their right of abode in Britain under the new legislation (Moore 2000, 4). In the 
House of Lords, peers such as the Conservative; Viscount Massereene and Ferrard criticised 
the government for “making a mountain out of a molehill” and disregarding British blood and 
British descent in the case of the 400 Falkland Islanders. Interestingly, the Viscount is fully 
aware that the Bill can be interpreted as racist, but argues that protecting the rights of British 
stock does not amount to racial bias, “it is not racist to me; it is common sense” (Massereene 
and Ferrard, HL Deb 07 Oct 1981). Politicians from across the political spectrum came together 
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to denounce the government’s treatment of the Falklanders. Labour MP Frank Hooley, who 
had campaigned for Britain to relinquish its colonial possessions noted the irony of the 
government’s position in championing the self-determination of the islanders whilst 
simultaneously making them second class British citizens (Hooley, HC Deb 07 Apr 1982). 
Meanwhile, in the governing Conservative party, notorious anti-immigration politicians Enoch 
Powell and Ivor Stanbrook stressed the history of the people in the Falkland Islands and how 
these 400, who had been demoted by the new legislation did not differ from the rest in any way 
other than the misfortune of having a great-grandparent born in Britain as opposed to a 
grandparent (Moore 2000, 4-5). However, on the issue of rendering the non-white peoples of 
the dependent territories as second class citizens, there was no such uproar. It is clear that the 
racial prejudice on which the empire was first built was still very much in the thinking of British 
politics at the time of the Falklands War.  
 
2.3 The Falklands Effect 
Until the invasion, and even during the war itself, the government maintained that there would 
be no amendment to the Nationality Act, with Margaret Thatcher arguing that it was 
unnecessary as in practice these 400 CBDT Falkland Islanders would be treated with the same 
courtesy and afforded the same rights as their neighbours and family members who were full 
British citizens should they choose come to Britain (Thatcher, HC Deb 20 Apr 1982). The 
government did not want to make any amendments to the Act which might undermine the 
integrity of the ‘flood-gates’ holding back the population of Hong Kong, especially when the 
issue at hand concerned just 400 people (Moore 2000, 5).  
Nevertheless, an amendment was made in 1983 after the conclusion of the war. Leaving 
this portion of the Falklands’ population as CBDTs after they had been invaded by a foreign 
power and after Margaret Thatcher had been publicly extolling their virtues as a people in 
drumming up domestic British public support for the reconquest of the islands would have been 
politically toxic and challenged her commitment to the islands which had been massively 
increased by the conflict. After the war, the government vehemently denied that their 
exclusionary policy regarding the islands and their distancing themselves from the situation 
had encouraged the Argentinians to believe that Britain’s commitment to the Falkland Islands 
was wavering (Waddington, HC Deb 03 Feb 1983). Despite the denial, it is a logical line of 
argument that the British government’s apathetic response to the case of these 400 islanders 
could have been interpreted in Argentina as a sign that the British would not defend the islands 
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if attacked. It is possible then that had Thatcher’s government taken a more hard-line racial 
stance in the first place, the Argentinians may have thought twice about attacking territory 
populated by British citizens. Thus in terms of nationality and citizenship, the most direct 
consequence of the Falklands War was an amendment to the 1981 act introduced in 1983 that 
granted full British Citizenship on the 400 or so remaining Falkland Islanders who had been 
rendered the lesser status of CBDT (Nationality Act FLK 1983, Sec 1-3). The effect of this was 
to elevate the entirety of the Falklands population to the same level as Gibraltarians, full British 
citizens with greater rights and freedoms than citizens of the other dependent territories who 
were predominantly CBDTs and, crucially, not white.  
 
2.4 Overseas Territories 
The CBDT citizens of the remaining dependent territories would not be granted access to full 
British Citizenship until the Overseas Territories Act of 2002 which also implemented a change 
in the title given to these territories from ‘dependent’ to ‘overseas’. This was certainly an effort 
to modernise their image and status in a new century, and indeed a new millennium, but also 
to begin redressing the imbalance caused by the frankly racist nationality and immigration 
legislation of the past. The government White Paper on Britain and its overseas territories does 
not explicitly mention or detail this racial imbalance, but through the frequent mention of the 
historical provisions made for Gibraltarians and Falkland Islanders and how these people 
enjoyed more rights and freedoms than citizens of the other overseas territories and the latter’s 
grievance about this state of affairs, this racial bias is heavily implied (Partnership for Progress 
and Prosperity 1999, 16-18). The Overseas Territories Act itself was framed by then Minister 
of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, John Battle, as “amending” the 1981 
Nationality Act while “building” on the provisions made in 1983 Falkland Islands amendment 
(Battle, HC Deb 05 Jun 2000). This in turn frames the 1983 amendment as not having 
compounded the racial inequality of the 1981 Act but as having reduced it, which could be 
interpreted as accurate in a legal sense, but in practice was not the case.  
Another example that showcases the 2002 Act’s modernising and positive intentions is 
the section granting full British citizenship to the majority of the Chagossian people (Overseas 
Territories Act 2002, Sec 6). However, in a series of written answers to questions posed by the 
then fringe Labour MP, Jeremy Corbyn, on the subject of the Chagossians, the government 
confirmed there were no plans for any potential return of the Chagossians to the BIOT (HC 
Deb 10 Apr 2002). This was despite a British High Court ruling in 2000 that the British 
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government position was in contravention of the constitution of the BIOT and that excluding 
the Chagossians from their homes was unlawful. This ruling would be overturned by the 
government through Orders of Council using Royal Prerogative in 2004 (Snoxell 2008, 127). 
This particularly underhanded way of maintaining the status quo and continuing to prevent the 
Chagossians from returning to their homeland from which they were forced by the British 
government demonstrates the persistence of this racial prejudice in decision making vis-a-vis 
the overseas territories. The dispute remains unresolved to this day and the Chagossians have 
not been permitted to return to their homeland. 
 
2.5 Significance of the 1982 War 
It is difficult to say just how much of a role the Falklands War and its subsequent amendment 
to the 1981 Nationality Act played in the decision making process behind the 2002 Overseas 
Territories act, but the racial imbalance created by the 1981 Act and compounded by the 1983 
Falklands amendment were plain to see and patently embarrassing in a 21st century context. 
Given then that it was the Argentine invasion of the Falklands that led to the sudden reversal 
of the British government policy of distancing itself from the Falkland Islanders and the 
subsequent change in citizenship status (Moore 2000, 7), it is logical to conclude that the 
Falklands War certainly had some wider significance for British territorial interests overseas. 
The apathy the government demonstrated in the case of the 400 CBDT Islanders before the war 
could have been used to combat any accusations of racial bias as the rules were simply applying 
to everyone. However, by amending the 1981 Act specifically for the Falklands the British 
government had bent these rules and acted in a biased fashion in favour of ethnic British 
persons. It has been theorised repeatedly that the main purpose of the 1981 Nationality Act was 
to exclude Hong Kongers from being able to emigrate to Britain. However, if an amendment 
could be made to restore citizenship to these Falklanders, then an amendment could be made 
to specifically exclude Hong Kongers from claiming full British citizenship on political 
grounds as opposed to racial ones, whilst restoring this status for the citizens of all other 
dependent territories regardless of ethnicity. 
A Hong Kong amendment was not made and thus the Falklands War had helped create 
the unequal citizenship landscape that the British government would attempt to rectify with the 
Overseas Territories Act in 2002. These factors were and are of direct relevance to life in the 
British Overseas Territories and demonstrate the wider significance of the Falklands War on 
the lives of the people that live in them. 
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3. Economic Commitment 
 
This section focuses on the economic commitment made to the Falkland Islands in the wake of 
the 1982 war and what wider effect, if any, this had on Britain’s economic commitment to the 
other overseas territories.  
 
3.1 The Falklands Economy 
The islands are difficult to access, the terrain is rugged, with few trees, vegetation is hardy and 
there are many cliffs and rocky outcrops, while the climate is cooler than Britain in summer 
but slightly warmer in winter. The Falklands constitute a greater land area than many small 
countries, but have always maintained a miniscule population. The land itself is of poor quality 
and the generally cool climate renders it unsuitable for many agricultural activities (Williams 
1983, 14 and Royle 1995, 307, 315). Given the geographical limitations present, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that by the time of the Falklands War, the economy of the islands had long been 
dominated by sheep farming and the production of wool for export. The international market 
price of wool was thus the single most important economic variable for the population of the 
islands (Freedman 2005a, 40). This trade was itself dominated by a single entity, the Falkland 
Islands Company, which owned 46% of the total area of the islands and through its ownership 
of many of the big farms, accounted for 44% of the total wool production. The company also 
provided internal shipping, operated vessels that exported wool internationally and ran the 
islands’ banking services. Many islanders held some level of resentment at the FIC’s colonial 
style domination of the economy and repatriation of profits to its British parent company, as 
opposed to investment in the Falklands themselves (Freedman 2005a, 40 and Aldrich & 
Connell 1998, 203).  
The 1970s was a decade of steady economic and demographic decline for the Falkland 
Islands. The population fell to new lows due to emigration and the Labour government of the 
time was negotiating with Argentina over the territory (Freedman 2005a, 40). The geographer 
and politician, Lord Shackleton, was sent to the Falkland Islands in 1976 to conduct a study 
into the economic status and future of the territory, it is surmised with the intention of 
strengthening the case for greater association with Argentina and even the transfer of 
sovereignty, in line with Labour’s wider policy of decolonisation (Royle 1995, 315). However, 
Shackleton judged the Islands to be economically viable, noting how the Falklands had 
established a trade surplus, returned more funds to Britain than had been given to the territory 
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in aid and investment and had a profitable local government (Freedman 2005a, 40-41). 
Shackleton also made a number of suggestions and recommendations that would revitalise the 
Falklands’ stagnating economy and improve quality of life for the islanders, chief among which 
was an extension to the rudimentary runway that served as the only point of access to aircraft 
on the islands (Freedman 2005a, 41). While Shackleton convinced the then Prime Minister 
James Callaghan of the importance of the runway investment, the Ministry of Overseas 
Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the former of which controlled the 
funding, remained unconvinced. The FCO feared that such a large investment in the islands 
would be interpreted as a pledge to the islanders and the British people of the government’s 
commitment to the territory, a commitment it did not want to make in light of its ongoing 
negotiations with Argentina. Indeed, there was little in the way of an economic case for 
prioritising the economy of the Falklands over trade with Argentina and South America at large 
(Freedman 2005a, 41-42). Shackleton’s report had been too positive for the government’s 
purposes, and little action was taken in implementing his recommendations, the economy and 
population of the Falklands thus continued to decline (Royle 1995, 315).  
 
3.2 The Direct Effect of the War 
The British government’s non-committal approach to the Falkland Islands continued under the 
Premiership of Margaret Thatcher that began in 1979. A census carried out in 1980 showed 
that the population of the Falklands had fallen to an all-time low of 1,813 people (FIG Census 
2016, 14-15). It is not ridiculous to suggest that had Argentina not invaded, population decline 
would have continued through migration, which in turn would have furthered the decline of 
the local economy and given enough time, led to the collapse and end of the colony as a British 
overseas territory. But, Argentina did invade, and after a war that made global headlines and 
cost the lives of some 255 British servicemen, the government initiated a stunning reversal of 
this non-committal approach. The ‘Fortress Falklands’ plan to increase the military presence 
on the islands and in the surrounding ocean, had existed before the war, but had not been a 
politically viable option. The war changed everything, particularly the domestic political 
landscape regarding the territory. To restart negotiations now would have been political suicide, 
especially after the economic and human cost of reconquering the islands. In the eyes of 
Margaret Thatcher, the war had solved the sovereignty question once and for all (Aldrich & 
Connell 1998, 209), and she now felt obliged to invest in fortifying and developing the islands, 
so as to prevent anything like the invasion from happening again, and because the future status 
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of the territory was now clear and assured. Lord Shackleton was asked to revise and update his 
1976 economic survey, and this time, action was taken (Royle 1995, 315). 
By far the greatest economic commitment Britain has made to the Falklands has been 
in the realm of defence. The first major investments were the construction of the Mount 
Pleasant airbase and the establishment of a much larger military garrison on the islands. A 
garrison that would actually be able to mount a staunch defence of the territory should 
Argentina decide to invade again. Despite a proposal recommending around 3,100 personnel, 
defence chiefs based their budgeting on an assumption that the garrison would consist of no 
more than 2,000 personnel (Freedman 2005b, Sec. 9, Ch. 44). Meanwhile, the airbase would 
serve as both a civilian airport and a military base, improving accessibility and air freight to 
the islands, with the establishment of a regular air service for civilian passengers (Freedman 
2005b, Sec. 9, Ch. 44). The estimated cost of the airbase was somewhere between £200m and 
£300m, already a significant addition to Britain’s defence budget. The Falklands’ defence 
precipitated a 3% annual increase in military spending to cover the costs, the highest point 
being 1983-1984, in which some £624m was allocated to help establish a stronger presence on 
the islands. The 3% increases ended in 1986, at the same time as the Mount Pleasant base was 
entering the final stages of construction (Grove 2002, 311). However, the cost of maintaining 
the garrison with associated hardware, including; fast-jet aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and 
several Royal Navy vessels is an ongoing, annual commitment. Between 2006 and 2011 the 
yearly cost of the garrison and its maintenance increased from £65m to £75m (Brooke-Holland, 
HC Lib 2012, 3-6). This expenditure is a direct result of the 1982 war, and is certain to have 
wider significance for Britain and its ability to defend the other overseas territories as 
successive governments have promised repeatedly in official statements and publications.  
In terms of the general economy, efforts focused on using the wool industry as a 
springboard for diversification. The large farms were divided and taken out of private 
ownership and the majority became the property of local families, giving them a direct stake 
in the economy and a greater incentive to stay on the islands. The most successful form of 
diversification would turn out to be a fishing licensing scheme, which would prove to be the 
salvation of the economy and an extremely lucrative venture (Freedman 2005b, Sec.9 Ch.44). 
At its height, the scheme was generating £30m per year and in more recent years still generates 
between £12m and £15m annually. Much of this revenue has been invested in the Falklands, 
rather than repatriated to Britain and internal communications, education, health and other 
infrastructure have improved dramatically as a result (Dodds 2012, 697). It is important to note 
that apart from the military commitment, the British government directly provided just two 
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financial aid packages after the war, £15m for the reconstruction of infrastructure damaged and 
destroyed in the fighting, and £31m for development. The islands have become economically 
self-sufficient and development beyond this initial £31m was derived from the territory’s own 
profits and the work of the self-funding FIDC (Taylor & Miller, HC Lib 2007, 47-49). Greater 
accessibility and improved infrastructure have also allowed for the creation of a burgeoning 
tourism industry. The benefits of this economic turnaround are illustrated by the dramatic 
change in the population of the Falklands, which has almost doubled since the war. From its 
1980 low of just 1,813 people, the population has grown steadily reaching a new height of 
3,398 in 2016 (FIG Census 2016, 14-15). This growth is the direct result of new economic 
opportunities and jobs created by investment and development, as well as much easier access 
provided by the Mount Pleasant airport which are in turn the result of the Falklands War.  
 
3.3 The Wider Picture 
As government White Papers are eager to point out, many of the overseas territories are 
economically independent of Britain, each with their own distinct strengths, weaknesses and 
challenges (White Papers - 1999, 30-34, 2012, 31-36). The fourteen territories can be divided 
into smaller groups that share certain characteristics that explain a lot about their economic and 
development status. Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Gibraltar 
have all carved out important positions for themselves in international financial markets and 
are economically self-sufficient with high GDP and levels of development, these territories do 
not receive economic aid from the British government (Clegg & Gold 2011, 127 and White 
Paper 2012, 32-33). There are the uninhabited territories that are the subject of scientific and 
missions, like the British Antarctic Territory and South Georgia, and territories that serve only 
as military outposts like the BIOT and Akrotiri and Dhekelia, economic development and 
commitment is less of a concern in these places. The group to which the Falklands belonged, 
along with Montserrat, St Helena and others, were those with the greatest level of dependence 
on Britain, typically due to geographic and demographic limitations; for these territories 
independence was and is an unrealistic prospect (Royle 1995, 320). It is difficult to identify 
any broad conclusions regarding the economic commitment made by Britain to its territories, 
but lessons from the Falklands experience including the war and the economic transformation 
it inspired can be applied to other locales within its group, such as St Helena.  
Aside from the fishing licensing scheme, perhaps the most important investment in the 
Falklands was the Mount Pleasant airport. Improving the ease of access for people allows for 
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the possibility of tourism, a truly lucrative industry. St Helena, with its sub-tropical climate, 
dramatic coastline and attractive wildlife is a territory that has always had far greater tourism 
potential than the Falklands, and a larger population to boot (Royle 1995, 319). However, its 
economic situation has been similar to the Falklands pre-war, with limited industry, poor access 
and a massively declining population (Aldrich & Connell 1998, 61, 67 and SHGSDP 2012, 3). 
The crucial difference is that St Helena is not the subject of a sovereignty dispute, and therefore 
not at risk from invasion by a foreign power, “had it been invaded by Argentina as the Falkland 
Islands were in 1982, presumably it too would have […] benefitted from massive sums of 
British government aid” (Russell, HC Deb 21 Oct 1998). An airport has been the wish of the 
people for many years, viewed as the salvation of the economy and the key to reducing its 
dependence on British economic aid and becoming self-sufficient (White Paper 2012, 33).  
The Falklands War created some discussion in parliament as to the economic future of other 
territories. It had served as a reminder to the British government and people that these remote 
territories still exist and rely on Britain. The case of an airfield/airport for St Helena was raised 
in relation to Mount Pleasant on the Falklands but was met with the same reaction that plagued 
the proposal for many years. Successive British governments balked at the cost and justification 
for building an airport on St Helena delaying the proposal for decades (HC Deb 04 Dec 1984, 
22 Jan 1997, 19 Nov 2003). After years of lobbying and promises made in the Labour 
government’s 1999 White Paper on the overseas territories promising to explore the feasibility 
of an airport, the Department for International Development finally agreed in 2005 that St 
Helena should have an airport within five years (White Paper 1999, 33 and Clegg & Gold 2011, 
131). The airport was not opened until 2016, 33 years after the issue was revived in a 1984 
parliamentary session discussing the prospects of other territories in light of the Falklands War.  
Militarily, the economic commitment of fortifying and garrisoning the Falklands has 
not reduced the status of other overseas territories that serve as military outposts. Indeed, in the 
case of Ascension Island, it has increased the importance and use of the airbase there, which 
continues to serve as a staging post to the Falklands (White Paper 2012, 111). However, 
whereas the BIOT and Akrotiri & Dhekelia serve an important strategic function in the modern 
world, less so is true of the Falklands itself. The strategic importance argument is of limited 
value in relation to the Falklands, which may have been useful in policing Cape Horn in the 
colonial era but with the fall of the Empire became decreasingly useful or important in modern 
times. The military commitment and its associated economic cost is entirely a deterrent 
measure, aimed purely at Argentina. However, this cost did not have such a major effect on the 
general defence plans laid out in the government’s 1981 defence white paper The Way Forward. 
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Indeed by the late 1980s the size and formation of Britain’s armed forces was very much as 
had been planned before Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands (Grove 2002, 307). This 
would counteract any argument that the Falklands War had reduced Britain’s ability to defend 
the other overseas territories. What the war did do, was to greatly enhance the reputation of 
Britain’s armed forces domestically, allowing defence planners greater leeway and budgetary 
freedom in how they structured Britain’s defence commitments overseas, in part guaranteeing 
their maintenance after the end of the Cold War (Grove 2002, 316). If anything then, the 
Falklands War and the military commitment it created could be said to have had a positive 
impact on other British territories, maintaining or indeed increasing Britain’s commitment to 
those that serve as strategic military outposts and acting as a justification for the continued 
international reach of Britain’s armed forces. 
 
3.4 Significance of the 1982 War 
The significance of the 1982 War for the Falkland Islands cannot be exaggerated. The war 
paved the way for sustainable economic development that would soon render the territory self-
sufficient, ending the need for economic aid from Britain. It also created an ongoing military 
commitment for the British government in the South Atlantic, which brought with it much 
needed infrastructure and an all-important air link to the islands. These were the direct effects 
of the war on Britain’s economic commitment to the Falkland Islands, but were the economic 
effects of the war felt in other territories? The answer is not straightforward. The war and the 
revitalising effect it would have on the Falklands economy did not inspire the British 
government to repeat their investment and development strategies in other overseas territories 
in the short term. Indeed, the high cost of the war and the fortifications implemented thereafter 
had an impact on the economic landscape that delayed further investment and development in 
other territories. Besides, Hong Kong was the headline issue during this post-war period and 
given that the other territories did not face the same kind of existential threat, it is unsurprising 
that attention turned away from the economic issues of a small number of British territories 
with diminutive populations, for many years.  
It could be argued that the economic development of the Falklands brought about by 
the war has had wider significance for other overseas territories due to this development 
allowing the territory to graduate from receiving British aid, in turn freeing up that money to 
be used in developing other territories. However, the cost of maintaining the military presence 
on the Falklands is so large it dwarfs any amount of money that was spent annually on assisting 
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the Falklands economically. Indeed, had the war not happened and the economy not 
transformed as a result, the Falklands may well have become Argentinian through diplomacy 
and depopulation, reducing Britain’s economic commitment entirely.  
In the same vein, the economic development of the Falklands brought about by the war 
could be seen as having elevated it above other territories of a similar geographical and 
demographic status. This creates an imbalance, especially when one considers the amount of 
money that was and is spent on the Falklands, a territory with a population much smaller than 
St Helena, Montserrat or other comparable territories. As with the citizenship case, accusations 
of racial bias could be made. In any case, the sudden reversal of the Falkland Islands’ fortunes 
at least provided some small spark in reigniting the case for developing these other declining 
territories like St Helena. That is not to say that the British government would act quickly on 
these cases. St Helena would have to wait decades for an airport that the Falkland Islands would 
receive in just four years.  
By 1999, six territories were still receiving development aid from the British 
government. Between 1999 and 2012, this number had dropped to three. Clearly progress was 
made in the first decade of the 21st century, but this is already a long time after the Falklands 
War in 1982. In my view the Falklands War can be considered part of the historical economic 
landscape that has shaped the development and commitment Britain has made to its other 
territories but in terms of direct effects, the war’s wider significance is limited. Yet, to argue 
that it was of absolutely no wider significance in this respect, would be in my view, inaccurate 
and reductive. This was the only such incident in the modern era where Britain went to war 
over a dependent territory. How the aftermath of this war was managed economically taught 
numerous lessons, especially in calculating how much capital is necessary upfront to revitalise 
the economy of one of these small territories and what kind of military commitment is 
necessary to deter a looming belligerent. Indeed, without the war it seems unlikely that the 
Falklands would ever have been developed at all, and the fact that they were developed so 
suddenly surely put the territory ahead of others perhaps more deserving and more in need of 
the same investment. There is thus some wider significance for the other British overseas 
territories, stemming directly from the Falklands War.  
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Conclusion 
 
Analysing the effects of the Falklands War through three disparate thematic lenses that apply 
to other British overseas territories, I found that the Falklands War had at least some wider 
significance in all three. Admittedly, it had more provable significance in some themes than in 
others, but the key is that this wider significance exists, where some have argued there is none 
at all. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins made a sweeping statement when they declared that 
the Falklands War was of “no wider significance to British interests and taught no lessons”, 
one open to challenge. However they have not been alone in dismissing or making light of the 
significance of this conflict. On the surface it would appear to be an open and shut case, 
Argentina had coveted the territory for many years, decided to take the territory by force and 
were soundly beaten in this endeavour. The war was short and decisive, with a comparatively 
low number of overall casualties for an inter-state conflict. Since this defeat, there has been no 
attempt by Argentina to conquer the islands militarily.  
On the theme of self-determination, the Falklands War is significant for other British 
overseas territories in that this was a conflict that openly used the will of the people living in 
the territory in question as a major justification for going to war to defend it. Whether Falkland 
Islanders are legally entitled to the right to self-determination under international law is a point 
of contention, but by going to war with it as justification, Britain has committed itself to making 
that case for the Falkland Islanders, and indeed the citizens of all other British overseas 
territories. Furthermore, if another territory were to be attacked, there would be an expectation 
that Britain defend it. Assurances to this end have been made in successive government 
publications on the subject of Britain’s relationship to its overseas territories, one could say 
self-determination has become a foundational pillar of this relationship. One could also argue 
that this is the result of an international shift in discourse within decolonisation, from arguments 
of territorial integrity to self-determination. However, the government could make no 
assurances on the future status of the Falklands in the years before the invasion, but were more 
than willing to make these assurances after, stressing the importance of the right to self-
determination.  
It is hard to imagine that the government would be so willing to make self-
determination such a fundamental part of its overseas territories policy, had it never had to go 
to war to defend one of these territories. The Falklands War changed the political landscape in 
Britain vis-a-vis its remaining colonial possessions. Before the conflict, Britain had wilfully 
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ignored the wishes of territorial citizens on numerous occasions, invading one territory and 
forcibly deporting the native citizens of another. After the conflict, in which British lives had 
been given to defend the islanders’ choice to remain an overseas territory, such a blatant 
violation as had taken place in Anguilla or the BIOT would weaken the government’s position 
in the future regarding the Falklands dispute or any others that may arise. It would also likely 
lead to political furore domestically and a great deal of unnecessary pressure on the head of 
government. The Falklands War made headlines internationally, and brought a magnifying 
glass to small, forgotten overseas territories across the globe.  
On the subject of citizenship, racial prejudice that has plagued British government 
policy and decision making for many years comes to the fore. Citizens of the then dependent 
territories once enjoyed the same rights and freedoms as British people born in Britain itself. 
After many years of immigration Acts and other measures aimed at curbing the rights and 
freedoms citizens of dependent territories along with citizens of the commonwealth and other 
colonies enjoyed, the Thatcher government introduced the 1981 Nationality Act. This Act 
created a new form of British citizenship that denied citizens of the dependent territories the 
rights of full British citizenship they had previously enjoyed, including the right of abode in 
Britain. However, special provision was made to offer ‘routes home’ for those ethnic British 
people in other territories, who could claim citizenship through a patrial link. This legislation 
threatened to leave several hundred Falkland Islanders, at this point in time a significant 
proportion of the small population, without full British citizenship, as they did not have the 
correct patrial link to the British mainland. Their case was made in parliament, but the 
government was prepared to ignore their plight. There was no such uproar for the different 
ethnic groups populating other territories that were negatively impacted by this act. Despite 
denials from the government that the act would be amended, it was, in the aftermath of the 
Falklands War, giving these 400 or so islanders full British citizenship, in line with the rest of 
the Falklands’ population.  
Without the war, there would have been no amendment. What it did, was to make the 
British government’s citizenship policy vis-a-vis its overseas territories, blatantly biased on 
racial grounds. Falkland Islanders and Gibraltarians were elevated above citizens of other 
dependent territories by virtue of their ethnicity alone. Whether this racial bias was intentional, 
or the act was simply a way of preventing non-British citizens of Hong Kong from emigrating 
to Britain before the handover of the territory, does not change the fact of the matter that the 
legislation was fundamentally biased, and on racial grounds. This injustice would not be 
rectified until the Overseas Territories Act of 2002, which restored the rights lost by all citizens 
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of overseas territories in 1981, conveniently after Hong Kong had been handed back to China 
and in a period where scrutiny of racial bias was intensifying. Had the war not happened and 
thus the amendment not been made, the government could have argued that this citizenship 
policy was balanced in its implementation, with the same rules applying to persons of all ethnic 
backgrounds. The war did happen, and the amendment it spawned showed that the rules could 
be changed and the goalposts shifted on the government’s whim. The Falklands War was 
therefore directly responsible for accentuating and cementing the racial bias of British 
citizenship policy, which unquestionably held wider significance for other British Overseas 
Territories and their people.  
The picture is less clear on the theme of Britain’s economic commitment to its overseas 
territories. Before the war, the Falklands were a dying economy, dominated by companies that 
did not invest their profits in the decaying local infrastructure. Industry was concentrated in 
one principle area, which itself was vulnerable to a volatile international market. The Falklands 
were annual recipients of British economic aid, but the British government did not want to 
commit to developing a territory with a small population it may well decide to hand over to 
Argentina. The invasion and subsequent war ended the British government’s delaying tactics 
over making a decision. Real investment followed and the economy was salvaged, with 
diversification leading to real and sustainable growth and improved accessibility, reversing the 
territory’s population decline. Self-sufficiency became a reality. The British government was 
however obliged to spend billions fortifying the Falklands and maintaining a garrison there to 
deter Argentina from attacking again. This is an ongoing economic cost that far outweighs the 
economic aid the Falklands used to receive.  
The war and its positive economic effect raised the case of comparable territories 
struggling economically, notably St Helena, which with a population over double that of the 
Falklands had wanted an airport for many years but never received one. It would be very 
difficult to argue that the Falklands War led to the decision to build an airport on St Helena that 
would be made many years later in 2005. However, as with the citizenship case, the Falklands’ 
rapid economic development post-war created an imbalance, where a territory with a small 
population and more limited economic prospects had been prioritised over territories with 
larger populations and greater economic prospects. This imbalance has still not been fully 
rectified but progress has been made. It is difficult to say whether the expensive economic 
commitment of maintaining the Falklands garrison has adversely affected the development aid 
received by other territories. Seeing as they are the respective responsibilities of different 
governmental departments with individual budgets, the answer is probably no. However, the 
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war shifted the government’s overseas development priorities, forcing the long deferred 
decision to develop the Falklands. The effect of this was to move the territory to the top of the 
list, in place of arguably more deserving territories, subsequently delaying their development. 
On the other hand, one could argue that despite the Falklands War being an expensive venture, 
it has undoubtedly saved money in the long run by revitalising a once decaying economy. 
Drawing conclusions on the wider significance of the Falklands War in this theme is extremely 
difficult. In all likelihood this is the arena in which the assumption that the Falklands War was 
of no wider significance to other British overseas territories is most accurate.  
In the historiographical debate surrounding the Falklands War the aftermath and effects 
have focused on its domestic political effect for Margaret Thatcher’s re-election campaign, and 
the revitalisation of the Falklands themselves. Little to nothing has been written on the wider 
impacts of the war for the other British overseas territories which share the same constitutional 
link with Britain as the Falkland Islands. This thesis has demonstrated the existence of some 
of these wider effects and shown how this historical anachronism was more than simply a flash 
in the pan in the final days of British colonialism. The waters disturbed by the sinking of 
Argentine and British ships sent ripples across the globe that have washed up on the shores of 
the far flung reaches of the remaining British territories. There are many more potential avenues 
of research on this line of thought, but the Falklands War was thirty-six years ago now and its 
shadow grows smaller both in the minds of the average layman and that of the academic with 
an interest. 
As wars go, the Falklands War could hardly be described as the most objectively 
significant or important conflict of the 1980s, let alone the 20th century. That said, to deny it 
any wider significance at all is inaccurate and reductive, especially when that wider 
significance concerns the effect of the war on other territories which share the same political 
status as the Falkland Islands. These are remnants of the colonial era, either too small to become 
independent or harbouring no desire to become independent that maintain a constitutional link 
with Britain by democratic choice. This is the only example of one of these territories being 
attacked by a foreign power in the modern era and hopefully the last, yet if it were to happen 
again the citizens of the territory in question would expect to be defended by Britain, the same 
way the Falkland Islanders were defended in 1982. The extent to which the Falklands War 
could be considered a conflict of wider significance for the other British overseas territories is 
thus in my view, considerable.  
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